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'But many scientists are still far from convinced by warming theories. I believe the U. S. and other 
countries should heed these skeptics and wait before implementing major restrictions on carbon 
emissions.' 
  Nobel laureate Gary Becker (1992) 
 
'An organization called Redefining Progress enlisted five economists – the Nobel laureates Robert 
Solow and Kenneth Arrow, together with Harvard's Dale Jorgenson, Yale's William Nordhaus, and 
myself – to circulate an "Economists' Statement on Climate Change,' calling for serious measures 
to limit the emission of greenhouse gases.' 
  Professor Paul Krugman (1997) 
1. Introduction 
Global warming is a hot topic. On the one hand, skeptics urge us to keep our cool. On the other hand, 
it might not be an option we have. Curbing human activities comes with high costs and therefore 
policymakers hesitate before suggesting remedies. But the harm from waiting looms large and it may 
become irreversible. Therefore, environmentalists and international treaties demand action. Balancing 
evidence with doubt requires acute abilities in the political economy of global warming. In this article, 
we shall propose to approach the issue by utilizing a framework of optimum data based policymaking.  
 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) raised the important question of status quo bias in decision making and 
policy formation. They asked why governments so often failed to adopt policies that economists 
considered efficiency-enhancing. Their answer entailed a status quo bias. We go further and ask: What 
must a benevolent policymaker know in order to dismiss status quo and implement economic 
measures? We use climate change and associated policies as the concrete example to shed light on the 
process. In this article we develop a framework within which to formulate policy on the basis of 
evidence, allowing for considerations of social consequences, and taking account of scenario 
probabilities by employing a social strategy mandate arising from general elections. 
 
Policymaking as public action stands at the intersection of three large branches of knowledge: decision 
theory, economics, and political theory. Although there is a large body of literature on the three 
different strains of thought, e.g. statistical inference and the theory of justice, few studies have sought 
to investigate the lines along which a framework, combining the three traditions and with particular 
relevance to policy, can be constructed. In this article we attempt to sketch such a framework. The 
synthesis must track the process from the initial exploration of data to the final implementation of 
policy. Let us explore why it would be useful to present the elements of that process at a high level of 
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abstraction. Collection and use of data in policy in general can be non-existent, uncoordinated, or 
misdirected. It can also be well targeted, measured, and welfare enhancing. Consequently, it would be 
desirable to obtain a framework within which characteristics of optimum data based policies can be 
explored. The global warming question lies at the meeting point of several scientific traditions, so 
policy recommendations vary. In this article, we shall put forward an economic basis. 
 
There has been considerable research in all three mentioned branches of knowledge. However, an 
attempt at reviewing all the policy relevant research here would not be adequate use of space. 
Nevertheless, some general comments may be allowed. Since the political economy of global warming 
policies relies on insights gained in diverse fields, the challenge is to identify the interface of those 
fields. In decision theory, results have been obtained on how to approach decision making under risk 
and uncertainty when many scenarios are possible. Central tools are the loss function and strategies 
with which to choose action rules; see e.g. Rice (1995) for an introduction. However, decision theory 
is silent on how economic policymakers can acquire social welfare measures of costs and how to 
obtain socially acceptable strategies. Economics and political theory complement decision theory by 
studying total costs, distribution of costs, and political mandates. Thus, a policymaker or an 
international agency may invoke results from the three fields when considering implementation of a 
global warming policy. 
 
An impressive literature may be consulted for certain sub-segments of the proposed synthesis. 
Chamberlain (2000) and Brown (2000) deliver recent studies on the application of decision theory. 
Keuzenkamp and Magnus' (1995) work on tests contributes to understanding the need for balancing 
evidence against doubt, earlier raised by Hall and Selinger (1986). In fact, Neyman and Pearson (1933, 
p. 296) suggested already seven decades ago that "...how the balance [between error types] should be 
struck must be left to the investigator." The balance in the statement refers to the weighting of the 
evidence of absence with the absence of evidence concerning the issue at hand. Thus, the construction 
of measures of social welfare is the bridge between economics and decision theory, and is key to the 
political economy of the question. Consult Hanemann (1994) for an excellent exposition of why 
economists have developed a tool like contingent valuation to address some questions that emerge 
from welfare considerations of non-market situations. Geweke et al. (2000) offer useful additional 
comments upon the link between statistical inference and decision making. Of course, in economics 
there is a long-standing tradition of performing cost-benefit analyses (CBA), see Hanley (1999) for a 
general treatment and Tol (2001) for cost-benefit analyses in climate change policies. Tol points out 
the remarkable lack of attention equity concerns have received in climate change issues. These 
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concerns are related to justice, but exactly what is a just distribution of the costs and benefits remains 
unclear and unresolved. Ultimately, it is a question for political theory and philosophy; a question e.g. 
Rawls (1971) addressed. In the real world, politicians who are elected by an electorate give the 
mandate for social strategy to policymakers. We realize, then, that an examination of the process from 
data to policy must build on separate studies in sub-fields that may lie far apart, an argument similar to 
the one Baumol (2000) calls the marriage of theory, data analysis, and application to serve as a new 
foundation of our discipline's applied work. Consequently, it is a challenge to students of political 
economy to contribute towards an integration of the specialized studies.  
 
The thrust of our argumentation can be summarized thus. A policymaker should acquire evidence on 
global warming from the scientific community. The evidence will consist of scenario probabilities and 
scenario effects. The effects must then be interpreted in terms of social welfare considerations, and as 
a result social costs represent the target loss function. Social costs include in principle both the total 
amount of burdens and the distribution of burdens. In order to implement a policy rule, the 
policymaker must, ultimately, make use of a political mandate on handling expectations and 
distributions, both current and intergenerational. It raises important questions related to equity and 
justice, and thus invokes political philosophy. That mandate represents public sentiment on how to 
balance welfare. In short, the three elements that a policymaker needs are: evidence, consequence, and 
strategy. Let us term this approach the optimum data based policy formation. This is not an empty or 
self-evident scheme because there do exist several alternatives to optimum data based policy making. 
One alternative is an ideologically formed policy that is not data based. Another one is a policy that 
does not use social welfare as the loss function or measuring yardstick, but for example a personal or 
partisan loss function. One example of the latter is the adoption of a conservative scientist's fear of too 
early rejection. By using these alternatives as yardsticks that we may use to investigate the content of 
the proposed framework, we shall show below how to comprehend the benefits of using data in 
decision-making and the social justice in using social welfare in distinguishing between different 
decisions. 
 
Let us say in advance where we are headed. The next section motivates the need for this study and 
presents the contextual background upon which it should be interpreted. Section three introduces the 
methodology and the nomenclature. In section four, we go on to present the framework of an optimum 
data based global warming policy. In the subsequent sections five and six we discuss the loss function 
and social strategies. Section seven discusses problems and further research, and the final section 
concludes. 
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2. Background, Motivation, and Literature 
If the null hypothesis of no link between human activity and global warming is true, then measures are 
unnecessary and costs are misdirected. However, if the null hypothesis is false, and humans do in fact 
contribute to global warming by their actions – by economic processes and the way we organize 
society – the consequences of not reducing those contributions may be devastating. It is crucial that 
society is able to differentiate between the two, or at least present balanced policies that weigh 
different probabilities. To that end, many approaches can be thought of. One would be the academic 
approach of focusing attention towards one type of mistake, the mistake of falsely rejecting a true 
hypothesis. In this approach, rejection should come only when the conjecture at hand has been 
falsified without doubt. Similarly, some commentators believe, in the same spirit, that a new policy 
should not be implemented until its merits have been demonstrated beyond doubt. This view entails 
requiring very solid proofs of humanly generated global warming before acting. Others go further and 
refuse intervention as a matter of principle. This attitude may be founded on ideology. While the first, 
conservative approach is based on data, the second is not. It is based on a pre-analytic principle. A 
similarly pre-analytic policy suggestion is found at the other extreme. Some commentators suggest 
intervention and implementation of policies without scrutinizing data. This eagerness is often founded 
on personal belief systems. A fourth approach is the precautionary better-safe-than-sorry of watching 
particularly that part of the outcome matrix in which the most devastating consequences occur. As the 
first, this is also a data based policy, distinguishing itself from the first by weighting probabilities and 
consequences differently. Notice that this approach may imply policy implementation before the 
hypothesis of no humanly generated global warming has been scientifically rejected.  
 
How shall a benevolent policymaker choose between the four different approaches? There is no 
straightforward answer. To complicate matters further, there exists an array of additional policy 
options, combining and extending the mentioned four. Choosing an approach is thus a complex 
question that optimally is founded in a variety of political economy considerations. This article studies 
such considerations. 
 
Let us first examine some views on statistical inference in economics. In empirical economics, there is 
a convention of accepting those empirical results that show statistical significance at a pre-specified 
level, often five percent. A policy version of this convention could be similar to the conservative, 
scientific approach mentioned above. It would recommend a policy only to the degree it relied on 
statistically significant reports on global warming effects. However, an important literature originated 
when McCloskey (1985) explained to the economic profession the old insight that statistical 
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significance is an attractive name for a more arcane, technical matter related to sample size. It is not to 
be confused with economic or substantial significance; see McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) for a review 
of current economic practice. McCloskey claimed that the loss function had been mislaid. This is an 
interesting statement to us because we go further and actually ask where the loss function is and what 
it looks like.  
 
In policymaking, the interest generated by empirical estimates is less connected to t-values and more 
connected to economic meaning, relevance, and impact. In fact, Wald (1939) stated the challenge 
clearly: "The statistician who wants to test certain hypotheses must first determine the relative 
importance of all possible errors, which will entirely depend on the special purpose of his 
investigation. Thus, again, the observation that the loss function has been mislaid still begs the 
question of where it is and what it looks like. In the problem of global warming, any policy approach 
will entail consequences, and the consequences must be considered along with the probabilities. 
Moreover, decisions must be made, often without much time to ponder the issue and investigate 
proofs. Society cannot escape the difficulty of computing all the consequences by refusing to deal with 
them. The enormity of the calculus involved allows no escape. Even a decision of passivity – of doing 
nothing – is a policy decision. This is very different from the consequences resulting from refusing to 
investigate a difficult problem in science or refusing to reject a generally believed hypothesis. 
Summers (2000) captured the inescapability of policymaking when he said: "...as an academic, if a 
problem is too hard and does not admit of a satisfactory solution, there is an obvious response: work 
on a different problem. That is not a luxury that one has in government." Thus, there is a need for a 
systematic way of looking at the policy balance of probability and outcome and the resulting weights it 
assigns to certain errors may be different from the conventions in science. 
 
Uncertainty is one aspect that is frequently addressed in the environmental literature. That literature is 
relevant to the computations of the consequence matrix. An important strain in that literature arose 
with Arrow and Fisher (1974). They suggested the point that when decisions must be made in the 
presence of uncertainty, the value of information is enhanced. Quasi-option value is a concept 
designed to capture the value of that information. The knowledge that knowledge will be gained in the 
future is thus incorporated into the decision of waiting until decision-makers are more certain, 
implying that the probable value inherent in waiting outweighs the potential costs of waiting. 
Unfortunately, the literature does not investigate where the balancing rod should come from. Further, 
there is a myriad of contributions into specific sub-fields dealing with what actions to take in the face 
of the unknown. Recently, Fisher (2000) has studied investment under uncertainty and option values in 
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environmental economics. Forsyth (2000) has dealt with estimation of option value of preservation. 
Moretto (2000) looked into irreversibility issues and strategy under uncertainty. Sims (2001) discussed 
the minimax approach of model uncertainty. However, there is no coherent explanation for how to 
assess, incorporate, and weigh social consequences. Further, while the uncertainty literature neglects 
equity issues and problems of justice, the equity literature does not incorporate decision theory. Justice 
is dealt with separately, and is the subject of philosophers like Rawls (1971). It is also scrutinized 
theoretically in welfare economics, but in both cases they are not linked to data and outcome 
scenarios. Yet another angle stems from the descriptive policy literature. The results from policy, 
when agents may have other agendas than general welfare, are studied in public choice; see e.g. 
Buchanan (1998, 2001). Furthermore, the desire to construct a normative basis for decisions of social 
impact led to the branch of social choice theory; see e.g. Arrow (1963). Below, we will describe how 
an extension of social choice can be made to incorporate the empirical evidence found in data. 
 
Having first sketched an outline of the many different distributions to the process from data 
acquisition to policy decision, we claim second that there is a paucity of binding the contributions 
together. This article is an attempt at offering a meta-analytical framework to link them together. 
 
3. Methodology and Nomenclature 
Let us establish the nomenclature. A null hypothesis, a null for short, is an assumption about the world 
and which mechanisms the world or the society operates under. The null hypothesis may also be an 
idea about certain relationships relevant for policy or a guess about the magnitude of an effect or a 
parameter. Its complement is called the alternative hypothesis. They cannot both be true. Since the 
alternative hypothesis comprises the complement of the null hypothesis it may in fact be a set of 
hypotheses. Here, we shall make it as simple as possible, without loss of generality, and consider only 
two states of the world, the one in which the null hypothesis is true and the one in which the null 
hypothesis is false, regardless of how false it is. Observe that we may allow the null hypothesis to be 
an interval, a vector, or a set. It is important to notice that when the null hypothesis is a point 
assumption about a parameter or a strict statement such as "there is no global warming" it may 
frequently be wrong, maybe always. Many commentators thus urge observers to realize that using a 
null hypothesis is most often only a tool for generating results and something to compare evidence 
with. Then, it does not matter that the null is false and thus rejected, because it often is. What matters 
is how false it is. In our binary set-up degrees of truthfulness are lost. What we gain is simplicity and 
transparency. The set-up can easily be generalized from a binary one to a continuous one, but it would 
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require more abstraction and thus lead to less availability. This article embraces the view that a null 
hypothesis is an apparatus to generate comments. But we also believe that to fix ideas it is useful to 
maintain and employ the concept of a null since by doing so observers may have a point of departure 
when statements about the world shall be made. In consequence, the dichotomous set-up this article 
uses, in which a null is either true or false, is only a mental heuristic we use in order to illustrate the 
delicate point that scientific evidence must be balanced by social consequences when it is to be used in 
policy. The continuous case follows exactly the same framework. 
 
A type-I error is the type of error that is committed when one rejects a true null hypothesis. A type-II 
error occurs when a false null hypothesis fails to be rejected. The probability of making a type-I error, 
given a specific test procedure, is conventionally assigned the Greek letter alpha. Sometimes it is 
called the p-level. The probability of making a type-II error is denoted by the Greek letter beta. By 
tradition, alpha is also known as statistical significance or size. It can be computed under the 
assumption that the null is true and that a specified empirical procedure is followed a given number of 
times. Naturally, the beta level is a function of just how false the null is. It is more likely that the 
testing procedure will detect the falsity of a null if it is far from the truth. Notice that in the continuous 
case the above terminology is less interesting since the null is often false, and thus the interesting point 
is not that it is false, but how much. One possible way to model this is to introduce new terminology in 
which we may use a notion such as type-III-error, measuring how far away from the evidence the null 
is. Instead of using two-by-two tables, one could have used arrays of two dimensions. However, we 
use the conventional model of type-I-error and type-II-errors because it is simple, familiar, highly 
illuminating, and sufficient for the purpose at hand. 
 
Statistical convention, going back some decades, typically gives an alpha level of five percent a 
special status. It is sometimes considered a mistake to reject a null if the computed alpha is above five 
percent. Another view says that an empirical result, for example a coefficient estimate, which comes 
with a low t-value should be distrusted. In truth, at what level a researcher decides to reject the null, or 
find a coefficient estimate significant, is completely a matter between her, the loss function involved, 
and the strategy employed. Statistical convention is at best an easy-to-use and sometimes-right 
heuristic rule. Statistical inference is the position taken concerning the belief in the validity of the null 
hypothesis. We will consider two types of inference, rejection and acceptance. A rejection occurs 
when the investigator believes that the null is false. An acceptance entails a belief that the null is true. 
This dichotomy is imposed as a matter of simplicity. Again, we may substitute the binary inference 
universe with a continuous spectrum, reflecting the fact that some test outcomes may show larger 
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departure from the assumed null than other outcomes. Thus, an investigator may be more or less 
certain of rejection and a policymaker have wide-ranging or specific remedies to implement. But such 
a continuity of the decision space would not enhance our understanding here and it would complicate 
the presentation. Therefore, allow us to keep it binary. Finally, the state-of-the-world is a term that 
denotes the unobservable truth about what state the world exists in. Once more the binary space of 
states is a simplification that comes with no loss of generality. It might also have been a continuous 
spectrum, but that would obfuscate, not facilitate, comprehension. The nomenclature is illustrated in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Rejection or Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses 
Inference State-of-the-world 
 Null is True Null is False 
Reject Null Type-I error  
Accept Null  Type-II error 
 
Notice that there are four possibilities. They are exhaustive of all combinations of state and action. We 
say that if the null is not explicitly rejected, it is accepted. The combinations are (true, reject), (true, 
accept), (false, reject), and (false, accept). Whatever the investigator or decision-maker decides upon, 
the decision has a corresponding cell in Table 1. This is a crucial point, since some analysts and 
political agents seem to believe that one may escape the positioning simply by refusing to take a 
position. In our system, a refusal to take a position would be equivalent to an implicit acceptance of 
the null, which corresponds to the lower row. The position may be true or false, and would be so by 
random, or at least without data scrutiny. Thus, Table 1 is the graphical equivalent of the truism that 
any position taken – also the refusal to take a position – necessarily precludes another position. In our 
context, if the null hypothesis is that human activity does not contribute to global warming, an 
unwillingness to form an opinion on the matter is translated to a belief that there is no relation between 
human activity and global warming. 
 
Table 2: Change or Keep of Prevailing Policy 
Policy Decision State-of-the-world 
 True Null, Policy Adequate False Null, Policy Inadequate 
Implement New Policy Type-I policy mistake, Wa, Pa Wb, Pb 
Keep Old Policy Wc, Pc Type-II policy mistake, Wd, Pd 
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In Table 2, we have depicted the policy parallel to a scientific position. Letters a through d denote the 
four outcome types. In data based policymaking policymakers may mimic hypothesis testing by 
linking policy decisions to keep or change policy to accepting or rejecting a null hypothesis. Table 2 is 
this article's version of comparable tables in DeLong and Lang (1992) and Zellner (1990). A 
combination of state and policy (state, policy) yields consequences for people involved. In the table, 
we denote welfare consequences W. The policymaker believes, or an analyst tells her after having 
seen the evidence, that each combination of state and policy will be realized with a certain (subjective) 
probability P. This is a perceived probability, as imagined by humans studying the evidence. It may or 
may not be a function of frequentist probabilities from repeated investigations or simulations. Upon 
realization of one state-of-the-world, the world is necessarily in one state or another. No probabilities 
are involved after realizations. However, which state the world is in remains undisclosed to 
investigators. Analysts have guesses based on instruments and indicators. Analysts then assign 
(subjective) probabilities to each state. 
 
Should policymakers emphasize the type-I error relatively more than the type-II error, as scientists do? 
There is no a priori basis for that status quo bias. An ideal policymaker should not necessarily wait 
until consensus is reached and established descriptions of the world are at hand. It may be too late. 
While waiting, policy must be based on balancing available evidence with reasonable doubt. This 
stance finds an early eloquent proponent in Friedman (1953): "…policy conclusion necessarily rests 
on a prediction about the consequences of doing one thing rather than the other, a prediction that must 
be based – implicitly or explicitly – on positive economics." 
 
So, policy should be founded on data and in theory. Let us examine the roles of the policymaker and 
the analyst. Let us call data X. The data X may be stochastic, and thus have distributions. Using data, 
analysts estimate, theorize, test, and ultimately form a belief about the probability vector (Pa, ..., Pd). 
The data may indicate that surely, the world is in a state in which the null is true. Then the sum of the 
subjective probabilities in the first column will be large, possibly close to unity. Or data may hint that 
it is unclear which state the world is in. In that case, the subjective probabilities assigned may be 
evenly distributed between the two columns. Thus, when using data in policy one must start with 
analysis. The data X offer a window into natural phenomena, economic mechanisms, and social 
processes that allows analysts to form an opinion about what the state of the world is. In order to form 
such opinions, they use statistics or summary of measurements m(X) and a theory t(m(X)) that are 
transformations of the data X into scalars, vectors or sentences that condense the data X into 
something meaningful and interpretable. When the data X are stochastic, so is any statistic m(X). 
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When the statistic is based on a sample drawn from a population it is stochastic also. The statistic thus 
has a distribution, but when analysts inspect it, they do not know its distribution. It may be Normal, 
Poisson, Gamma, or something entirely different. In other words, there may be false alarms and 
missing alarms, and researchers do not know how often each occurs. Analysts may believe that 
humans have generated global warming because their measurements indicate that it is the case. It 
might be otherwise, and instruments will then give false alarms. Analysts may believe there is no 
relation between human activity and global warming because data and theories suggest variation has 
been going on for millennia. Then, the data, and our handling of it, would fail to trigger the alarm. 
Ultimately, the policymaker must take all this into account, compare it with consequences and social 
acceptance of risk, uncertainty, and distribution of burdens, and then make a decision. Let us study the 
process in more detail. 
4. Optimum Data Based Policymaking 
We employ the decision theoretic approach and terminology as described by Rice (1995). For 
simplicity and no loss of generality, let us compare four different decision rules: two data based rules 
and two ideological rules. The first rule we shall study is what we may call the ideological laissez-
faire decision rule. Using it, policymakers are curbed by rules set out ex ante not to interfere with 
market solutions. The second we shall call the statistical significalist or conservative decision rule. 
Using it, policymakers side with conservative scientists, and act only when a null hypothesis of no 
relation between human activity and global warming has been rejected at a low alpha-level. The third 
rule we term the better-safe-than-sorry rule or the precautionary rule. Using it, policymakers act much 
sooner on indicators of a possible relation between human activity and warming than is allowed by the 
significalist rule. The fourth is the radical interventionist rule. Using it, policymakers try to preempt 
humanly generated global warming regardless of what indicators say. The first and the last rule are 
pre-analytic rules and not based on data. The second and the third rule are analytic rules, based on 
evidence. There are, of course, many other possible rules. We use these four to fix ideas, and to ease 
understanding since simple rules enhance transparency and comprehension. 
 
Assume that the analysts possess an index that can combine all the instrument readings of global 
warming. This index is a statistic or summary of measurements m(X), and it is a function m() of the 
data X. The data X contain both observations on natural phenomena and possible human interaction 
with nature. Analysts must try to disentangle what nature sets up with no human assistance on the one 
hand, and how nature responds to human processes on the other. Let us focus attention on the human 
contribution. The aggregate statistic of human contribution may be discrete or continuous. It may be a 
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scalar or a vector. For simplicity, assume that the vector can be compressed into a meaningful scalar, 
and that its scale is translatable into easily understood intervals. Let the index be normalized to run 
from 0 through 20, keeping algebra at a minimum and reserving it to the compression of the index. 
Further, let a metric score of around 10, for example from 8 to 12 indicate no humanly generated 
global warming, a score below 6 humanly generated global cooling, and a score above 14 humanly 
generated global warming. In this system, global warming without human cause is symbolized in the 
first interval. For now, we use global warming for humanly generated global warming. Let there be 
gray zones of doubt from – say – 6 to 8 and 12 to 14. When the statistic falls between 8 and 12, we 
assign to it the score m_0. For the cases when it falls into intervals 12 to 14 and above 14, we say that 
the statistic scores m_1 and m_2. 
 
Of course, the question of what policy to implement is most controversial when the statistic – as a 
symbolization of all accumulated human knowledge at the time – lies in the gray zone. In Table 3 we 
list the four decision rules and what policy actions correspond to what levels of the statistic. Using 
Occam's razor, we do not describe the nature of the policy actions here. Naturally, we realize that 
policy actions may form a continuous spectrum. Thus, a realistic description or an operational recipe 
would require policy to be a continuous function of the statistic. We simplify by substituting the 
continuous function with a discrete one. 
 
Table 3: Four Decision Rules 
Rule Data based? Action when m_0 Action when m_1 Action when m_2 
d_1 Ideological 
Laissez-faire 
No No policy, a_0 No policy, a_0 No policy, a_0 
d_2 Statistical 
Significalist 
Yes No policy, a_0 No policy, a_0 Policy, a_1 
d_3 Better-safe-
than-sorry 
Yes No policy, a_0 Policy, a_1 Policy, a_1 
d_4 Radical 
Interventionalist 
No Policy, a_1 Policy, a_1 Policy, a_1 
 
From Table 3 we observe that the most interesting differences occur in the cells of row three and four 
and column four. The two data based rules Statistical Significalist and Better-safe-than-sorry specify 
different policies when the statistic is in the gray zone of doubt, namely when the score is m_1. The 
Statistical Significalist rule commands policymakers to await more evidence. The Better-safe-than-
sorry rule states that society should err on the safe side, and implement policy even when the evidence 
has not confirmed a relation between global warming and human activity. 
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First Element: Evidence 
In economics, data and theory combine to offer a better position than a blind guess. The world is a 
risky and uncertain place so we compile data to understand the world, but our data may be random 
because they are only samples from a much larger population universe or because they contain random 
noise. It follows that the statistic m(X) is stochastic. A policymaker needs to acquire a rudimentary 
grip on the distribution of that statistic in order to make inferences about changes in it over time. She 
needs to know how reliable the statistic is, and how often it makes erratic calls. 
 
The analysts thus face an inference problem. They know that even if there is no humanly generated 
global warming and the statistic (our aggregate evidence) should show 10 or m_0, there exist 
stochastic processes that come in between the state of the world and the signal they receive. 
Sometimes then, the statistic shows 14 or m_2 even when the state of the world is no warming. Most 
often, however, when the statistic shows 14, there is global warming. Analysts know this, but do not 
know which is which when they encounter a score of 14. Based on simulations, theories, experiments, 
and experience they will assign probabilities p of how to interpret the measurement signal. Thus, the 
subjective probabilities p are functions of the state of the world, measurement signals captured by 
observed statistics, and the experience of the scientists. To simplify, let us refer to the state of the 
world with the letter s for state, and let 0 represent the state-value of no humanly generated global 
warming. We give the complement, humanly generated global warming, state-value 1. Again, policy 
relevance may be gained by using many degrees of human contribution, and so a sophistication of this 
simple model would utilize a continuous scale instead of a binary pair of 0 and 1. 
 
Table 4: Metric in States of the World and Subjective Probabilities 
Statistic No global warming, s_0 Global warming, s_1 
m_0 p(0,0) p(1,0) 
m_1 p(0,1) p(1,1) 
m_2 p(0,2) p(1,2) 
Sum 1 1 
 
From Table 4 we realize that it is of the essence how precise the measurement signals are and that the 
degree of imprecision is known to some extent. There will be false alarms and missing alarms and 
these constitute obstacles to ideal policymaking. 
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Second Element: Consequence 
Since policy involves the welfare of people, benevolent policymakers need a gauge of how people are 
affected. Normatively, we take it as an axiom that social consequences must be the measuring rod, not 
arbitrary statistical conventions. Constructing a loss function of social welfare is, however, a 
challenge. In the minds of any policymaker, politician, and economist lies the idea that some policies 
are preferable to others. Here, we project that idea into an application. We propose that some ranking 
between social outcomes is possible, and that some approximation of relative importance must be 
attempted. We claim that it is human nature to rank and compare outcomes, and that societies – as 
aggregates of human nature – seek to rank and compare outcomes. However, Arrow (1963) has shown 
that the aggregation of an individual ranking to a collective ranking is a complex, not always feasible, 
problem. Nevertheless, we postulate that a congregation of two or more individuals can agree on a 
ranking between at least two social outcomes. In addition, the different outcomes are comparable in 
some (unspecified) sense. Measures of loss can be assigned. That is a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition for the idea of an optimum data based policy. If or when no rankings of aggregate, social 
outcomes are attainable, policy may as well be decided upon through on a game board with dice. An 
example of the contours of social welfare is tabulated in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: The Loss Function for Social Welfare 
Policy Action State-of-the-world 
 No Global Warming, s_0 Global Warming, s_1 
Policy, a_1 Unnecessary Costs Original Status Restored 
No Policy, a_0 Original Status Catastrophe 
 
We observe that Table 5 is especially asymmetrical on the northwest to southeast diagonal when the 
unnecessary costs are very different from the costs of a catastrophe. The hard part in gauging the 
consequences is to establish the relative losses and distribution of losses associated with each 
outcome. Let us for now suppose that the loss function is thought to be what is tabulated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Relative Magnitudes in the Loss Function for Social Welfare 
Policy Action State-of-the-world 
 No Global Warming, s_0 Global Warming, s_1 
Policy, a_1 -a -b 
No Policy, a_0 0 -c 
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The state-policy combination of (no warming, no policy) entails no changes from the status quo. We 
assign the outcome a loss of 0. There are two cases of policy implementation. In the first, the policies 
are redundant because warming is unaffected by human activity. Since resources are scarce there exist 
many alternative ways to use resources. Thus, societies assume costs without any benefits. Suppose 
careful consideration gives this outcome a loss of a. The minus sign in the table indicates loss. In the 
second case, the policies are needed because human activities do in fact contribute to global warming. 
Thus, societies assume costs and reap the benefits. If the policies restore an original status of no 
warming, a conscientious scrutiny of costs and benefits may deem the loss to be of magnitude b. The 
worst outcome results from a type-II policy error: the failure to reject a false hypothesis. When there is 
a connection between human activity and warming, but society fails to detect it and does nothing, the 
loss may be estimated at c. That loss may be daunting. Let us contemplate the problem of picking a 
rule to balance probabilities and consequences. 
Third Element: Strategy 
In essence, society faces a dynamic, sequential game against nature in which what Nature plays 
initially is partly hidden to the observer, but Nature's historic plays will be revealed as time goes by. 
Here, we make it simple. We study only a one-shot game in order to illustrate the importance of 
evidence and consequence in policy. Society is the other player, and has at its disposal a whole range 
of plays. For our purpose, the range is compressed to a binary choice of policy or no policy. Let us 
study the details of different decision rules. In order to compare outcomes, we must establish an 
apparatus to do so. In decision theory, risk R is one such measure. There may be alternatives. Rice 
(1995, p. 575) defines risk as: 
 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
0
, , ( ) , , 0,1; 1,...,4; 0,1,2,k i j k i k i j j k
j
R s d E l s d m l s d m p m m S s k i j
=
=   = = = = = =  ∑  
 
in which loss l is the loss associated with a state s and a policy originating in a decision d and p is the 
subjective probability assigned to the assumed state-of-the-world based on statistic m. Subscript k runs 
over the two states of the world, subscript i denotes one of the four decision rules, and subscript j 
represents one of the three levels of the statistic m. Risk is a function of the state-of-the-world, the 
decision rule employed, and the statistic. It is defined as the expected loss over statistic (measurement 
signals) for a given decision rule in a given state of the world. 
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Let us inspect the risk involved with each decision rule. In Table 7a we compute the risks for the state-
of-the-world no humanly generated global warming, s=0, and in Table 7b we compute the risks for the 
state-of-the-world in which human activity contributes to global warming, s=1. 
 
Table 7a: Risk For 4 Decision Rules When There Is No Global Warming 
Decision Rule Loss Given Statistic and Policy under Decision Rule Risk 
 m_0, p(0,0) m_1, p(0,1) m_2, p(0,2)  
d_1 0 0 0 0 
d_2 0 0 -a -a[p(0,2)] 
d_3 0 -a -a -a[p(0,1)+p(0,2)] 
d_4 -a -a -a -a 
 
Table 7b: Risk For 4 Decision Rules When There Is Global Warming 
Decision Rule Loss Given Statistic and Policy under Decision Rule Risk 
 m_0, p(1,0) m_1, p(1,1) m_2, p(1,2)  
d_1 -c -c -c -c 
d_2 -c -c -b 
-c[p(1,0)+p(1,1)]-
bp(1,2) 
d_3 -c -b -b 
-cp(1,0)-
b[p(1,1)+p(1,2)] 
d_4 -b -b -b -b 
 
We observe from Tables 7a and 7b that the risk involved is different for each decision rule. The state-
of-the-world is hidden to society. When society uses the statistic m as an indicator, it uses available 
evidence to navigate. Using the statistic, subjective probabilities for which state the world is in are 
proposed. Combinations of state and policy yield social loss, and the expected loss or risk for each 
decision rule in each of the two states of the world can then be computed. However, a policymaker 
does not know how to approach the risk. The policymaker needs a strategy. A risk-averse 
policymaker, representing a risk-averse government, administration, or nation may decide to use an 
appropriate, risk-averse strategy, for example one we may call a minimax strategy. In that strategy, the 
minimum risk for each state-of-the-world is identified, and the decision rule that comes with the 
maximum minimum (i.e. the best of the worst), in absolute terms, risk is chosen. However, if one state 
is highly improbable given the evidence, society may not want to pay too much attention to it. 
Guarding against the terrible, but highly unlikely, is not necessarily a wise approach or something 
society wishes to do. Another strategy is what we may call the Bayes strategy. In it, the expected risk, 
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or Bayes risk, for each decision rules is calculated on a basis of a prior distribution of subjective 
probabilities: the distribution of state-of-the-world probabilities. In our example, there are two such 
subjective probabilities. The probability that the world is in a state of no humanly generated global 
warming π_0 and the probability of a relationship between human activity and global warming π_1. 
Using those prior probabilities, another way of identifying a strategy to choose the decision rule can be 
arrived upon: Use the decision rule with the most attractive expected risk given the prior. 
 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1( , ) 0, 1, , 1,...,4,s i i iE R s d R s d R s d iπ π π= = + = =  
 
In Table 8, we illustrate the difference between the two strategies. In the table we realize that what 
decision rule to use depends on what strategy lies underneath. For certain choices of loss, subjective 
probabilities, and priors the Strict Significalist may be a better decision rule. That is why it is preferred 
by many academics. In their private loss function there is great shame attached to being caught in a 
type-I error. Thus, for scientists the number a is large, and –a constitutes a huge loss. The loss of the 
other error, type-II, is small since it is likely to be shared with many other scientists. For society, the 
number a may often be much smaller than the number c. Consequently, society as a whole may wish 
to use another decision rule, for example the Better-safe-than-sorry rule. Further, the loss function 
involved may differ greatly from situation to situation, and from society to society. The strategy 
employed may be different from general election to general election. 
 
Table 8: Risk Comparison Chart of Two Strategies to Choose Decision Rule: Minimax and 
Bayes 
Rule Loss in State-of-the-world Minimum Risk Bayes Risk 
 No Warming, s_0 Warming, s_1   
Ideological 
Laissez-faire d_1 




























The outline above raises several questions. For example, by introducing the prior distribution in the 
Bayes strategy, the careful observer may ask what would be the difference between the prior π and the 
posterior p when the world does not repeat itself. To answer we must enter the debate on Bayesian 
inference, which we will avoid here; see Zellner (1990) or Rice (1995). It is not our purpose to settle 
such issues, only illustrate the use of different strategies in order to describe the elements of optimum 
data based policy formation. More importantly, risk or expected loss in one state-of-the-world is only 
one of many potentially relevant measures of the social consequences involved. One measure that is 
widely accepted in the engineering, may not be accepted for dealing with people. Moreover, instead of 
entering a scalar loss in each cell we might want to enter the whole distribution of population welfare, 
or at least a multidimensional vector. These are paramount questions to resolve, but they are not 
crucial to our purpose. Our purpose is to identify and outline the basic elements of policymaking. 
5. The Loss Function 
In economics, the concept of welfare has become a cornerstone in applied work, and Baumol (2000) 
attributes the current understanding of the term to Pigou (1912). In this article the founding idea of 
social consequence or social welfare is that at least two social systems may be imagined such that an 
electorate would prefer one to the other. That idea is appealing because the alternative seems 
inadmissible. To see why, assume conversely that all social systems imaginable are in principle 
indistinguishable in terms of social welfare. Then social science collapses to mere description, with no 
purpose, no motivation, and no anchor in the improvement of society. As a corollary of that position, 
we then need not worry about global warming since any social organization is as acceptable as any 
other, a position that intuitively feels unacceptable. This motivates accepting the contrary, the original 
assumption that there do exist at least two development paths in relation to climate change that entail 
different social welfare. Society would like to identify such paths, even when identification challenges 
the available apparatus. 
 
Let us focus attention to the loss function. In optimum data based policy formation, the loss is defined 
as: 
 
(3) ( ), ( ) , 0,1: 1,...,4,k il s d m k i= =  
 
in which state s denotes the true state of the world, decision d the policy decision taken, and statistic m 
the summary of scientific evidence. This is a model simplification. More fundamentally, the loss 
function l is a function l(sk, di(m); µ) of state and decision given the utility structure µ, representing a 
vector consisting of the individual utility functions, or social preference orderings, of the members of 
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society. We may not constrict ourselves to current members, but may also include future inhabitants. 
Thus, the utility structure µ is given by: 
 
(4) ( )1,..., , ,n n Nµ µ µ= ∈  
 
in which N is the set of all current and future members of society. The individual utility levels are 
given by µn. This utility structure is in much need of condensation. Otherwise, the multidimensionality 
of the loss l makes it a formidable, and contemporaneously impossible, task to represent it in policy by 
estimation. That does not alter the fact that any and every decision affects welfare. Thus, condensation 
using state-of-the-art techniques is a necessity in optimum data based policymaking. Condensation is 
what cost-benefit analyses attempt to do, by assigning equal weight to each monetary unit. See e.g. 
Bradford (1999), Hanley (1999), and Tol (2001) for examples of recent discussions and applications 
on climate change in particular and environmental policy in general.  
 
Typically, economists use estimates of the expectation of net cost, but there is no reason why not, 
except for tractability reasons, the whole distribution of costs should be employed. The cost-benefit 
concept is itself limited in scope as it usually represents estimates of tangible values, i.e. 
transformations of market, actual or hypothetical, bids. In theory, any concept of social consequence 
may be used. Economists increasingly accept that utility is extracted not only from consumption 
streams, but also from knowledge about the state of the world, existence of certain features and natural 
phenomena, options of opportunities, and distribution of welfare. As a consequence, methods have 
been developed and are currently under improvement to assess such values. Hanemann (1994) 
discusses the use of one such method, the contingent valuation method, and comments upon the 
controversies the method has evoked. Hanemann is in accordance with earlier authors. For example, 
Kenneth Arrow (1963, p. 17) wrote: "The individual may order all social states by whatever standards 
he deems relevant." Moreover, Gary Becker (1993, p. 386) stated: "Individuals maximize welfare as 
they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic." Finally, Schelling 
(1968) suggested an eclectic approach to obtaining priority lists by saying that the price system is only 
one way to find out what things are worth to people. Another one is to ask them. And asking is 
performed in a referendum; it is a mechanism designed to elicit preference rankings from society. 
Potentially, then, approaches emulating the contingent valuation method or actively using public 
referenda may be employed to obtain the perceived or experienced loss from much wider sources than 
has been attempted so far. In obtaining a social loss function in policymaking, it is a necessary 
requirement that light be shed on the welfare associated with different outcomes. 
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6. Social Strategy 
The economy is an apparatus society use to produce welfare. By clever organization and good 
arrangement of institutions society inspires effort and performance from its members. Intermediate 
products are goods and services, and they are distributed to people for their private disposal. The end 
product is welfare. How to ensure an acceptable level of welfare to all members of society is one of 
the most studied topics in all of economics, political science, and philosophy. One main strain in the 
literature is the application of a strategy to use in the construction of welfare. In an influential 
contribution, the philosopher Rawls (1971) outlined a theory of justice. In the theory, he discussed 
strategies that could be employed when addressing equity and distribution questions. There are many 
potential strategies so the goal becomes to obtain social strategies that represent individual attitudes in 
some specified way. Arrow (1963) showed that is a complex issue, and some permutations of 
individual preferences cannot be aggregated without imposing specific constraints. Recently, Barbera 
(2001), and Knoblauch (2001) examine some aspects of the social choice inherent in adopting such 
social strategies. Barbera is concerned with establishing collective choices that best correspond to the 
member individuals and characterize classes of social choice functions for different models. 
Knoblauch studies how elections can represent preferences and investigate properties of elections. The 
contributions demonstrate the inherent difficulty. Nevertheless, the need for strategy is inescapable 
since a policymaker may choose not to embrace a strategy, but that would also be a strategy. Thus, in 
optimum data based policymaking the strategies employed are sought to represent the opinion of the 
electorate. The social strategy is constructed to pick a decision rule on the basis of the appropriate 
measure of outcome, so it is a mapping from a possibility space of states and decisions rules to one 
particular decision rule, symbolized in compact notation: 
 
(5) ( ), ; , 0,1; 1,...,4,Sk i is d d k iµ → = =  
 
in which S denotes social strategy. Above, risk was one example of measure M that is a function of a 
combination of state and decision that would augment the choice of strategy. Maximum inimum risk 
and maximum expected risk were two examples of goals for social strategies, defined on the measure 
M. There are many other issues to consider, i.e. many other measures Mj, the subscript j being element 
in large set containing what humans care about. Current equity is one. Intergenerational justice is 
another and sustainability a third, see e.g. Pearce and Atkinson (1995), Solow (1974), and Weitzman 
(1998). Option values and irreversibility are yet others. The list may become as large as societal 
concerns are numerous. Still, it becomes clear that in order to perform optimum data based 
policymaking strategies must be employed to choose among the many different decision rules. 
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7. Discussion 
The process from data acquisition to policy decision is intricate, as the above has illustrated. We have 
compressed the process down to three essential elements: evidence, consequence, and strategy. Such 
simplification enhances comprehension, but entails overlooked important facets and issues. Thus, 
there are weaknesses in a general framework that need be resolved in more detailed studies. Let us 
discuss some. First, the framework considers only one iteration of the process from data to policy. In 
reality, the process is an ongoing exchange between implemented policy and reception of new data. A 
multiple iteration model would show that a process may converge towards a reflective equilibrium 
between policy and data or diverge for political or other reasons. The difference between convergence 
and divergence cannot be portrayed in our framework. Second, we have considered a binary model in 
which the state-of-the-world and the decision universe have two categories, leading to a four-cell 
outcome space. Making both continuous would have reflected the world better and made the 
framework more realistic. However, sophistication is warranted only when it invites deeper insights. 
Here, the introduction of continuity in the models would have facilitated a gradual increase in policy 
realism and made the application of the framework more operational, but it would have weakened the 
emphasis on the broader policy scheme. 
 
Another concern is the utopian ideal of a benevolent policymaker. Principal-agent models and public 
choice theory have shown that policymakers may have private loss functions and hidden agendas. In 
fact, a whole field of thought emerged with Buchanan and Tullock (1962) to study many such aspects. 
But this does not preclude an exposition of an optimum data based policy formation process. Further, 
most policymakers probably operate on a convex combination of public and personal loss functions. 
Then there is a need to acquire an overview of the interplay between the public loss function and data, 
and present a special clarification when public policy must be distinguished from private strategies 
because of different loss functions. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In policymaking, making errors may be more dramatic than in research since policy errors may affect 
the whole society whereas scientific errors often only affect the scientist herself. Therefore, policy 
may sometimes be implemented without scientific proofs of the policy's merits. Additionally, while 
scientists often find themselves concerned with type-I-errors, a policymaker must weigh both type-I 
and type-II in each and every policy proposal according to the social outcome. For example, failing to 
implement a necessary policy directed at global warming can be much more dangerous to humankind 
than falsely implementing an unnecessary policy. In policymaking, committing a type-II error may 
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sometimes be perilous while making a type-I error merely annoying. For a scientist, it may be the 
opposite. Falsely rejecting a true null may entail loss of prestige (type-I-error), while failing to reject a 
false null (type-II-error) is shared with many other scientists, and thus comes with low cost. Thus, a 
policymaker must distinguish between the different kinds of loss functions. To balance findings with 
doubt, to consider social consequences, and to project public opinion on welfare matters, a 
policymaker needs assessment of three elements: evidence, consequence, and strategy.   
 
The three elements may be illustrated in a sequence of three steps. First, the evidence found in data 
yield scenarios and probabilities emerging from scientific scrutiny and the employment of metrics and 
instruments, resulting in summary statistics. Second, the policymaker attaches social consequences to 
each scenario. The consequences comprise the loss function and acts as weights in comparing the 
outcomes. Third, to choose between different actions and decision rules the policymaker must use a 
strategy that mirrors a public mandate from an electorate. Associated with each outcome, the 
policymaker then attaches the social consequences in a loss function. The three-step process comprises 
the basic elements of an optimum data based policy. 
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